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1 Introduction
To cope with exogenous shocks, it seems obvious that ﬂexibility, often mea-
sured by the elasticity of substitution, is crucial. Indeed, when facing an
increase in commodity price or a decrease in a sector productivity, a more
ﬂexible economy with a higher elasticity of substitution will be more able to
substitute alternative productions or supplies, thereby mitigating the conse-
quence of the shock.
This paper questions this intuition, when diﬀerent sets of elasticity values
are used in the same model to compute the eﬀect of a shock. In the sim-
ple model presented in this paper, using an illustrative production structure,
calculations even lead to opposite results: a higher elasticity of substitution
can cause a higher reduction in production in response to a price or produc-
tivity shock. The reason behind this result is that all function parameters
have to be calibrated to ﬁt with observed economic conditions. When one
assumes a higher elasticity of substitution, ceteris paribus, it is necessary to
change the parameters of production functions to keep the equilibrium situa-
tion unchanged (Klump and Saam, 2008). The point is that, while the direct
eﬀect of the elasticity increase is to enhance resilience and reduce the total
cost of a shock, the indirect eﬀect through parameter changes is to decrease
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1resilience and increase the total cost. Over all, the latter eﬀect often exceeds
the former, and the total eﬀect of an increase in elasticity of substitution is
to reduce resilience and increase the vulnerability to supply-side shocks.
2 Model
We consider an economy with two sectors. The ﬁrst sector produces an in-
termediate goods that is used by the second sector, which produces a ﬁnal
consumption goods. For instance, the ﬁrst sector can be the infrastructure
sector that produces the services used by the rest of the economy (e.g., elec-
tricity, water, transportation services).
The ﬁrst sector uses a borrowed amount capital K, with constant return
to scale to produce the intermediate good M that is sold at price p. The price
of the capita K is supposed to be ﬁxed and equal to r. The intermediate
good market is supposed to be competitive.
The production function of the ﬁrst sector is:
M = βK. (1)
The condition of null proﬁt and market clearing leads to the equality:
pM = rK, (2)





The second sector is composed of n identical ﬁrms, producing an output Y
considered as the numeraire, which is sold at a ﬁxed price set to 1. Production
is assumed to be made with two inputs: the intermediate good M that is
bought at the price p; and labor L that is provided with inelastic supply ¯ L
at the equilibrium price w.
At symmetric equilibrium on the labor market, all ﬁrms use ˆ L = ¯ L/n
units of goods L. The ﬁrms are price takers on all the markets. The produc-
tion of ﬁnal goods is integrally useed by the workers and the capital owners.
The production function of the second sector is a Constant Elasticity
of Substitution (CES) function (Arrow et al., 1961), with an elasticity of
substitution σ = 1
1−ρ:




2If ρ = 1, we have σ = +∞ and the production function is linear with
perfect substitution; if ρ → −∞, we have σ = 0, and the production func-
tion is given by a Leontieﬀ production function, with ﬁxed factors and no
substitution. If ρ → 0, we have σ = 1 and the function is a Cobb-Douglas:
Y (M,L) = γM
λL
1−λ. (5)
Firm proﬁts are given by:
Π = Y (M,L) − wL − pM. (6)




(M, ˆ L) = p. (7)
This determines the value M∗, the total consumption of goods M by all
ﬁrms:
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Total production at equilibrium is Y ∗:
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In the Cobb-Douglas case, one gets:
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The value added created by this economy, i.e., the Gross Domestic Prod-







We assume that initial equilibrium conditions are ﬁxed: production is equal
to Y0, total supply of labor L is ¯ L, initial consumption of goods M is M0,
and initial price of the goods M is p0.
Such a calibration makes sense from a practical point of view: consider-
ing any economic sector, national accounts can provide an assessment of how
much input M is consumed by this sector (M0) at what price (p0), how much
labor (¯ L) is consumed, and how much is produced (Y0). The elasticity of sub-
stitution and the parameters of the production function, on the other hand,
are diﬃcult to measure and often have to be calibrated (Magnus, 1979). Also,
the elasticity is sometimes modiﬁed to account for various mechanisms. For
example, Rose et al. (2007) divide the elasticity of substitution by 10 to take
into account short-term rigidities in the economic system in the aftermath of
a disaster.
Here we assume that the elasticity of substitution is chosen ﬁrst (in an
ad hoc manner or from econometric analyses), and the other parameters are
then calibrated from economic data.
When the elasticity of substitution has been chosen (through the choice of
ρ), the values of parameters λ and µ (or, equivalently, λ and γ), are chosen as































0 ¯ L1−λ. (17)
As shown in Fig. 1, λ and µ increases when ρ increases and the elasticity
of substitution is larger. For instance, if ρ tends to −∞, i.e., if the production
function is a Leontieﬀ function, then λ and µ tend to zero. If ρ is close to zero,
i.e., if the production function is close to a Cobb-Douglas with an elasticity

































































































Figure 1: Values of the production function parameters, as a function of the
elasticity of substitution ρ, for ρ < 0 on the left, and ρ > 0 on the right.
These values are calculated with Y0 = 1, M0 = 0.1, p0 = 1, and ¯ L = 0.9.
In this case, λ is the ratio of intermediate consumption of goods M to total
production, i.e., the cost share of goods M. If ρ tends toward 1, i.e., if the
production function is close to the linear case, then λ is equal to p0 and µ is
equal to w.
These relationships are also apparent using cost shares, which are often







= (1 − σ)ln(p0) + σ ln(λ). (18)
This equation shows that the parameter λ has to be adjusted if σ changes
while p0M0/Y0 and p0 are unchanged.
More generally, this dependency shows that, when one wants to investi-
gate the inﬂuence of the elasticity of substitution using a sensitivity analysis
(Rose et al., 2007), it is necessary to take into account the direct eﬀect of an
increase in elasticity of substitution (through the production function shape)
and the indirect eﬀect of this increase (through the impact on the other pa-
rameters of the production function). The combined impact of these two
eﬀects is investigated in the next section.
54 Impact of a supply-side shock
We assess the consequence on production Y (i.e., on GDP) of an increase
in the price of goods M, for various values of ρ (between −∞ and 1). We
assume that the new price of the goods M is p = αp0. This increase in the
price of goods M could come from a reduction of the productivity in this
sector, for example, one could have β = β0/α. This is for instance what
can be expected if climate change reduces the productivity of infrastructure
capital. The amount of borrowed capital changes, and we assume that there
is enough unused capacity to respond to this demand, at an unchanged price
r.
Since the production Y is used as a numeraire, the price p is measured
with respect to the price of ﬁnal production. Replacing the price in the














The denominator in (19) cancels out when the cost of intermediate con-
sumption is larger than the value of production. In this case, producing does
not make sense, and production reaches zero.
The ratio Y ∗/Y0 is also the ratio of GDP after and before the shock and
is therefore a measure of the economic resilience to the price shock. The
derivative dσ of Y ∗/Y0 with respect to σ describes how resilience depends on
the elasticity of substitution. This derivative dσ has the same sign than dρ,
the derivative of Y ∗/Y0 with respect to ρ.







































A numerical analysis with α = 2, see Fig. 2, shows that the derivative of












Figure 2: Sign of dρ, the output ratio derivative with respect to the parameter
ρ, with α = 2. Parameter ρ is varied on the x-axis, while the y-axis is the
initial share of M in output, i.e., B = p0M0/Y0. In region (1) production
is impossible, in region (2) the derivative is positive, and in region (3) the
derivative is negative.
7or negative1. The ﬁgure shows three regions:
• In region (1), the denominator in (19) is negative, and Y ∗ is not de-
ﬁned (i.e., production becomes impossible after the shock). It is the
case when (p0M0/Y0)α
ρ
ρ−1 ≥ 1. In that case, the price of intermedi-
ate consumption is too large with respect to the price of production,
production is not possible and the economy collapses.
• In region (2), Y ∗ is positive, production remains possible, and the
derivative of production with respect to the elasticity of substitution is
positive. In this parameter domain, easier substitution smoothes the
shock, as the intuition suggests. For high ρ, i.e., near perfect substitu-
tion, this region spans the entire range. But for lower ρ, this region is
included in the domain where (p0M0/Y0)α ≥ 1 and (p0M0/Y0)α
ρ
ρ−1 < 1,
i.e., in the domain where the shock would make production impossi-
ble in absence of substitution but where substitution makes production
possible.
• In region (3), Y ∗ is positive, production remains possible, and the
derivative of production with respect to the elasticity of substitution is
negative. In this parameter domain, increasing ρ or σ, i.e., increasing
substitution, reduces resilience. Contrary to the intuition, an easier
substitution makes worse the consequences of the shock. Importantly,
this is the case for all values of ρ < 0, provided that (p0M0/Y0)α < 1,
i.e., provided that production would remain possible even in absence
of substitution.
In the extreme case of no substitution (the Leontieﬀ case), the price shock
has simply no impact on production level. For any value of α, indeed, when
ρ → −∞ (i.e., σ = 0) and (p0M0/Y0)α
ρ
ρ−1 ≤ 1, the production limit is Y0.
In fact, the additional cost of goods M is fully compensated by a decrease in
the cost of labor L, i.e., on w, because this goods is inelastically provided.
Most of the cases that are analogous to our illustrative production struc-
ture are to be found in region (3). Assuming that ρ < 0 (σ < 1), i.e., that
substitution is not too large, as found by most analyses (Kemfert and Welsch,
2000), and considering a large increase in the price of goods M by 100%
(α = 2), the model parameters would be in region (3) if (p0M0/Y0) < 1/2,
i.e., if the initial consumption of goods M represents less than half of the
value of production (i.e., if the cost share of goods M is lower than 50%).
As a comparison, according to the Bureau of Economic Analysis data,
the manufacturing sector in the US (in the 15-sector level of aggregation)
1Other values give the same result.
8consumes intermediate goods from the utilities sector for a value equal to
1.1% of its total production. Its largest client is itself (i.e., the manufacturing
sector), for a value of only 33% of its total production. In France, according
to INSEE, the industrial sector consumes energy for a value equal to 3.4%
of its own production in 2006 (it was only 1.6% in 2004).
It seems, therefore, that in this simple general equilibrium setting, con-
sistent with the US manufacturing sector or the French industrial sector and
their infrastructure-service supply, the larger the elasticity of substitution
between energy and labor, the larger are the consequences of an increase in
infrastructure-service prices (or, equivalently, of a reduction in infrastructure-
service production productivity). This counter-intuitive result is not due to
the direct eﬀect of substitution, which tends to smooth the shock when the
elasticity is larger, but to the indirect eﬀect of substitution, which makes the
two other parameters of the CES production function change.
In this setting, however, the hypothesis of perfect wages adjustment is
certainly exaggerated, at least in the short term. With less ﬂexible wages, this
mechanism should be reduced but remains present. Similarly, an unchanged
capital price after the shock is a special case, as is the existence of unused
capital. If there is no available capital, some investment (i.e., reduction in
consumption) would have to be spent in order to reach the capital stock level
that corresponds to the after-shock situation. In many cases, and in absence
of rapid depreciation, this amount of transient investment should however be
very low compared with the change in production.
5 Conclusion
This paper shows that, counter-intuitively, a higher elasticity of substitution
in production function can lead to a reduced economic resilience and a larger
vulnerability to shocks in production factor prices. This result is due to the
fact that assuming a higher elasticity of substitution requires a recalibra-
tion of the production function parameters to keep the model initial state
unchanged.
Even though the analysis presented in this paper uses restrictive hypothe-
ses, this analysis is suﬃcient to show that the relationship between elasticity
of substitution and resilience is not automatically positive.
This result has consequences that are important for economic analysis.
For instance, it is likely that climate change will aﬀect primarily the infras-
tructure sector, which has a long capital lifetime and will reveal at least
partly ill-adapted to new climate conditions, reducing its productivity. In
such a situation, a larger elasticity of substitution in the production function
9of the rest of economy that relies on infrastructure services may lead to a
higher vulnerability.
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